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Abstract—
A balanced approach is needed for developing information
security policies in Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)
contexts. Requirements Engineering methods can facilitate
such an approach, but these tend to focus on either security
at the expense of usability, or vice-versa; it is also uncertain
whether existing techniques are useful when the time available
for applying them is limited. In this paper, we describe a
case study where Usability and Requirements Engineering
techniques were used to derive missing requirements for an
information security policy for a UK water company following
reports of the Stuxnet worm. We motivate and describe the
approach taken while carrying out this case study, and conclude
with three lessons informing future efforts to integrate Security,
Usability, and Requirements Engineering techniques for secure
system design.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Information security policies in Critical National In-
frastructure (CNI) organisations need to be balanced. The
growth in technologies such as distributed control systems
and smart grids have meant that media reports about cyber-
warfare and terrorism have heightened the security aware-
ness of senior managers. However, the impact of such
policies extend beyond the board-rooms and offices where
they are drafted. Poorly written policies that constrain the
ability of staff to carry out their day-to-day work might
compromise operations, leading to the introduction of vul-
nerabilities to get around them. These problems can be
compounded by unforeseen events causing organisations to
re-think their current stance on information security. When
under pressure, the perception that security design is time
consuming may lead policy decisions to be driven by fear
rather than rationality. Because few people are fired for
making policies too secure, as long as usability and security
continue to be treated as qualities to be traded off against
each other, policies will err on the side of constraint over
freedom of action.
Existing work argues that balanced security and usability
can be achieved using Requirements Engineering best prac-
tice, but such work tends to emphasise security or usability,
but not both. For example, while the SQUARE method
[1] provides practical advice on selecting techniques for
eliciting security requirements for different organisational
contexts, it does not support the development of usability
artifacts. Similarly, while the RESCUE method [2] pre-
scribes techniques for human activity and context modelling,
it implicitly assumes that secure and usable systems will
naturally follow by applying the method. Unlike SQUARE,
RESCUE fails to pay attention to the adversarial element
intrinsic to security design.
A recent study demonstrated how Usability and Security
Requirements Engineering techniques can be aligned in
system design without considering Security and Usability
as trade-off concerns [3]. However, because this study took
place over a period of several months, it is difficult to deter-
mine how useful these techniques might be when working to
a tight deadline. In such situations, limited time is available
for collecting empirical data and running focus groups or
workshops.
This paper reports the results of a case study where a
user-centered approach was taken to elicit and analyse infor-
mation security policy requirements following reports of the
Stuxnet worm [4]. This policy covered operators working
at water-treatment plants in a UK water company. The
management imperative for responding to Stuxnet meant that
policy decisions needed to be made where there was both
a lack of time for data collection and restricted stakeholder
availability. Nevertheless, we found that an initial, up-front
investment in User-Centered Design activities paid dividends
throughout the study from assisting in vulnerability and
threat identification, through to spotting fallacious arguments
during risk analysis discussions. In section II we motivate
and present the approach taken to carry out the case study,
and describe our results. In section III, we describe some of
the lessons learned carrying out this study which, we believe,
inform future approaches for secure system design.
II. APPROACH
The aim of this study was to understand how successful
Usability and Requirements Engineering techniques might
be for eliciting and specifying organisational Information
Security requirements. Because this evaluation would take
place in a real-world context rather than a controlled en-
vironment, this case study was carried out as an Action
Research intervention [5]. Action Research is an iterative
research approach involving the planning of an intervention,
carrying it out, analysing the results of the intervention, and
reflecting on the lessons learned; these lessons contribute
to the re-design of the social action, and the planning of a
new intervention. Although primarily used in social science
and educational studies research, Action Research has also
been used to validate security design methods, e.g. [6]. The
objective of the intervention was to elicit and specify missing
requirements for an information security policy, as indicated
in section I. For reasons of confidentiality, this company will
hereafter be known as ACME.
The Action Research methodology used in this paper is
that proposed by Baskerville [7], who breaks an intervention
into five distinct phases:
• Diagnosis: Identifying the influencing factors in the
organisational context impacting the design of the in-
tervention.
• Actions Planned: Devising the planned process to be
adopted in order to meet the intervention’s objectives.
• Actions Taken: Carrying out the planned steps taken as
part of the intervention.
• Evaluating: Evaluating the outcome of the intervention.
• Specifying Learning: Stating the actions which need to
feed forward to future interventions or research.
For reasons of brevity, we will describe the actions
planned and taken in sections II-C, II-D, II-E, and II-F; the
discussion in section III constitute the results of the Evalu-
ating and Specifying Learning phases for this intervention.
A. Influencing factors
In July 2010, early reports of how the Stuxnet worm
had infected several industrial plants around Europe began
to appear. These reports shook up senior management at
ACME for several reasons. First, a long held assumption
that the obscurity of their SCADA (Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition) systems made them immune to security
was dispelled; the virus explicitly targeted the same type of
SCADA software used by ACME. Second, by combining
knowledge of zero day threats with a realistic means of
spreading the virus, i.e. via USB sticks, plant control soft-
ware no longer seemed as isolated as it once was. Finally,
although the motivation of the attacker was, at the time,
unknown, the technical sophistication of the virus suggested
that the virus was professionally developed to cause harm.
While ACME didn’t believe they were the virus’ target, they
were acutely aware that the impact of being infected was
largely unknown. They did, however, agree that an effective
means of mitigating the likelihood of being threatened was
to devise a specific information security policy for those staff
working in plant operations.
Although many of ACME’s sites were unstaffed, the
planned policy would cover staffed clean water plants and
sewage works serving large urban areas. These plants were
staffed by operators responsible for the running of the
plant, and its treatment operations. Plant operators were
acutely aware of the safety implications of clean and waste
water treatment. Waste water effluent which is not properly
treated could have a significant impact on the ecosystem
and the food chain. The clean water treatment processes are
also critical enough that quality warnings are automatically
forwarded to ACME chemists and quality assurance teams.
Plant operators were also made aware of the security impli-
cations of deliberate attacks on the clean water infrastruc-
ture. Like other employees at ACME, information security
communiques were regularly sent to all ACME staff, and
police periodically visited clean water treatment plants due
to the perceived risk of possible terrorist action. There was,
however, a feeling held by the information security team
that plant operators perceived the threats described in these
communiques as irrelevant to their work.
The new security policy would need to cover both the
existing infrastructure, and a new Enterprise SCADA system
currently being rolled out to other parts of ACME. There
were, however, two issues which would need to be consid-
ered when designing policy requirements for this system.
First, access to stakeholders working in this project were
limited. The project relied on external contractors, several
of whom were paid a substantial amount of money for their
expertise. Their insight would be required for this interven-
tion, but their time needed to be carefully managed. Second,
a number of technical requirements had been stipulated by
the Enterprise SCADA system manufacturer. At the start
of the intervention, it was unclear what impact these might
have on the security policy, and ACME’s ability to enforce
it without compromising this new operating environment.
B. Approach taken
Based on the influencing factors, we determined that the
intervention needed to be completed in a timely manner; this
would ensure that the initial analysis would be available to
senior managers quickly. We also determined that stakehold-
ers working at water treatment plants, from plant operators to
managers, would need to be engaged in the process without
underselling or overselling the importance of security and
usability in policy decisions. Finally, design activities would
need to be informed by the on-going design of the new
Enterprise SCADA system, and access to resources working
on the Enterprise SCADA project would need to be carefully
managed.
To meet this criteria, we devised a user-centered process
for eliciting policy requirements. This process was user-
centered because of its early focus on the needs of the
policy’s users and tasks, and the grounding of these needs
in empirical usage data. After agreeing the scope of the
policy, a Fieldwork phase was undertaken; this involved
holding in-situ interviews with users who would be affected
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Figure 1. Policy Requirements elicitation process
This data was used to build a qualitative model of security
perceptions held by plant operators. The results from this
phase informed two further phases: Usability & Security
Analysis, and Requirements & Risk Analysis.
Usability & Security Analysis entailed developing per-
sonas [8] and, using scenarios, describing the typical activi-
ties they carried out. In parallel with this activity, KAOS goal
trees [9] were developed to model the policy requirements,
and possible ways these requirements could be obstructed.
These obstructions were modelled using KAOS obstacle
trees. Where possible, obstacles were resolved at this stage
using policy requirements. Risks were elicited on the basis
of obstacles that could not be resolved without being first
discussed by stakeholders.
The Requirements & Risk Review phase involved creating
misuse cases [10] to describe the impact of the identified
risks, and holding a focus group with key stakeholders to
agree possible policy requirements for mitigating them.
As the UML diagram in figure 1 suggests, several dif-
ferent models were generated as part of this process. The
artifacts elicited during the analysis and review phases were
managed using the CAIRIS (Computer Aided Integration
of Requirements and Information Security) Requirements
Management tool [11]. CAIRIS builds upon the IRIS meta-
model [12], which describes how the concepts underpinning
these artifacts are linked. As a corollary, entering data
about these artifacts into the tool automatically generates the
different models according to the meta-model relationships.
Once the scope had been agreed, a little under two weeks
were set aside for carrying out the Fieldwork phase and
supporting qualitative data analysis activities. Usability &
Security Analysis took place over the following 3 week
period before initial policy requirements were available for
the Requirements & Risk Analysis review.
Further information about the process and how the dif-
ferent artifacts were generated are described in subsequent
sections.
C. Agreeing Scope
Existing documentation about ACME information security
policies was provided as an input to this process. On the
basis of this input data, an initial rich picture diagram of the
policy scope was developed. Due to time constraints, this
was developed off-site and distributed to stakeholders via
ACME’s Information Security Manager. Although prepara-
tion for Fieldwork commenced during this stage, the scope
of investigation was bounded only when the rich picture
diagram was agreed with ACME. The feedback received
from the ACME stakeholders involved word changes which
seemed minor, but were semantically significant to ACME.
For example, an association was drawn between one system
in scope to another box named after the physical location
of ACME’s head office; ACME’s telemetry group and their
servers were located at this site. Although the association
was valid, the box was renamed to Bunker to emphasise the
data flow to the telemetry group rather than other groups
located at the physical location; the name was commonly
used to refer to the group because they were located in a
bomb-proof building.
D. Fieldwork
The objective of the Fieldwork stage was to develop a
qualitative model of plant operations security; this would
be used to derive one or more personas representing plant
operators for later design activities. We visited 4 different
water-treatment works (2 clean water and 2 waste water)
to hold in-situ qualitative interviews with plant operators
and related stakeholders. Although these interviews were
largely open-ended, high level questions dealt with the
nature of work undertaken, including what plant operators
were responsible for, who they worked with, and how they
obtained help if necessary. Plant operators were also asked
about important work items and activities, and the problems
they often faced. Following the interviews, qualitative data
analysis was carried out on the interview transcripts and,
from this, a qualitative model of plant operator security
perceptions was derived
In addition to these fieldwork activities, goal modelling
also commenced at this stage. The documents used to drive
this activity included a draft security policy that ACME had
prepared, an ACME information handling guidelines docu-
ment, and ACME’s organisational security policy. As the aim
of the intervention was to elicit missing requirements from
the first of these documents, this was the primary document
used to elicit goals. For each policy recommendation in this
document, a goal was defined. As they were elicited, a goal
tree was induced based on statements which relied on the
satisfaction of other goals. Where supplemental documents
were referenced, the referenced statements also formed the
basis of goals.
In parallel with other activities, an asset model was
progressively developed and, by the end of this stage, was
mature enough to form the basis of analysing possible secu-
rity issues. This asset model was based on the AEGIS Asset
Model notation [6]. The qualitative data analysis carried
out indicated that the two prevalent contexts of interest
to plant operations staff would be activities taking place
during daylight hours (Day) and the the hours of darkness
(Night). With this in mind, assets and security values that
stakeholders appeared to hold about them were modelled for
each of these two contexts. Data about what constituted Low,
Medium, and High value assets were based on ACME’s own
risk management documentation.
E. Usability and Security Analysis
1) Usability Analysis: A plant operator persona (Rick)
was derived from the qualitative model developed in section
II-D. More details about the technique and how it was used
to develop this persona can be found in [13].
Once the personas were ready, 3 scenarios were developed
to describe how Rick would carry out his activities during
the Day and Night contexts; These scenarios were modelled
as tasks in CAIRIS, and textual narratives described how
the task was carried out in each context. For example, the
narrative associated with the Resolve reservoir alarm task
during the Day context was as follows:
Rick looks at the SCADA monitor nearest to him and
notices that the levels of the reservoir nearby are unusually
high. When the level gets too high, the entire works need
to be shutdown. In this situation, Rick knows exactly what
to do. After stopping the alarm, Rick logs into the ICT PC
next to the SCADA workstation, and clicks on the Xtraview
icon. After logging into Xtraview, he finds the location of a
pumping station 10 miles upstream on the map and connects
to it. After a few moments, he masters the main pump
before switching it off. Rick then returns the pump to its
normal slave setting before shutting down Xtraview. The
alarm periodically starts and stops again but, after about
an hour, the reservoir level normalises again.
Although the above task was identical for both Day and
Night contexts, there were a number of variations in other
tasks. This was due to the necessity for on-call technicians
to resolve problem that on-site staff could have fixed during
working hours.
2) Security Analysis: At this stage, the goal tree was
analysed to find obvious vulnerabilities requiring further
analysis. Although no obstacles were forthcoming, a number
of goals suggested policy requirements needing to be present
in order for them to be satisfied. One such requirement










Figure 2. goal tree fragment associated with Exposed ICT Cabinets
vulnerability
to authorised plant operators on the ACME portal. This
requirement arose from a goal stating that information about
authorised network points should be available to authorised
plant staff; this was necessary to allow plant staff to identify
network points which might be unauthorised.
Although no obstacles were obvious from the goal tree,
examining the empirical data collected during the Fieldwork
stage identified several vulnerabilities. An example of how
these were integrated into the goal tree is provided by
figure 2. During the site-visits, cabinets containing network
infrastructure were found in publicly accessible areas of
certain plants. Based on this, the Exposed ICT Cabinets ob-
stacle was introduced; this obstructed pre-existing goals for
securing the physical infrastructure. This particular obstacle
was mitigated with the requirement Key ICT equipment shall
be stored in a restricted access computer room. In the
figure, this requirement is abbreviated with the label ICAB-
1 because it references the ICT Cabinets asset (abbreviated
as ICAB).
When all possible vulnerabilities were mitigated, a threat
analysis step was carried out to identify possible attackers
and the threats they might carry out. From the empirical data,
two classes of attacker were identified. The first related to
thieves attempting to break into plants to steal scrap metal or
other equipment. Several plant operators expressed concern
about these attackers because the damage to monitoring
equipment they cause is inevitably greater than the value
of the items stolen. Plant operators were also worried about
their own personal safety should they be required to confront
them out-of-hours. A Kit Theft threat was defined to model
the impact of this attack.
The second class of attacker arose from a general indiffer-
ence that plant operators and engineers held about informa-
tion security threats. Even after describing the recent reports
of Stuxnet, participants interviewed were still unconvinced
that “hackers” were as convincing a threat as the press
and information security communiques would have them
believe. Consequently, to portray an attacker that would be
believable, an profile was developed based on a penetration
tester that could, potentially, be commissioned by ACME;
this attacker was grounded in a number of open-source
intelligence resources and texts on penetration testing. Based
on this attacker, several threats were identified, such as
war-dialling modems, footprinting to determine information
about possible ACME network services, and enumeration of
possible passwords using known defaults for software appli-
cations. Although several obstacles were elicited based on
these threats, no mitigating requirements could be identified
without further discussing the threats and their consequences
with ACME stakeholders.
F. Requirements and Risks Review
The final stage involved running a focus group with
ACME stakeholders and presenting the misuse cases en-
capsulating the unmitigated risks. These stakeholders were
operational managers responsible for plant security and a
representative ICT manager. Because only a limited amount
of time was available, the presentation of the analysis was
centred around a discussion of risks of most interest to
ACME: a virus-infected SCADA workstation, and a site-
break in. The misuse case associated with each risk was
presented, discussed and, based on the outcome, mitigating
strategies were proposed. For each discussed misuse case, a
misuse case model was developed; as indicated in section
II-B, each model was generated automatically by CAIRIS.
For the first risk, a policy requirement was added to
remove USB access to SCADA workstations. Responsibility
for the second risk was provisionally passed to ACME’s
facilities management department.
After updating the CAIRIS model based on these dis-
cussions, a revised specification document was re-issued
to ACME. Because of the limited time available during
the focus group, a more detailed review of the analysis
took place at ACME’s head-office several weeks later. In
this one-to-one session with ACME’s Information Security
Manager, the goal model and elicited policy requirements
were validated, and the risk analysis results were reviewed.
The purpose of this session was to ensure that all goals and
requirements were assigned a responsible role and responses
were elicited for each risk.
On completion of the study, 106 separate policy goal
statements had been elicited. The vast majority of these were
associated with the Day context; this reflects the many day-
to-day concerns that participants had with regards to security
policy coverage. Similarly, the threats most evident from the
empirical data were based on attacks expected to take place
during daylight hours.
III. LESSONS LEARNED
We believe the outcome of the intervention was a suc-
cess for two reasons. First, despite the challenging time
constraints, the study was completed comparatively quickly
without compromising the quality of the artifacts created.
As section II-B reports, the study was largely completed
in just over one month with ACME involvement limited to
occasional email discussions, in-situ interview participation
and a single focus group session to discuss key misuse cases.
Second, all elicited policy requirements were accepted by
ACME. Moreover, the design models created during the
study were used to help with other security issues in ACME.
For example, the Rick persona was subsequently used to
inform design decisions about user account profiles. In the
following sections, we describe three findings from this case
study that, we believe, inform future efforts to harmonise Se-
curity, Usability, and Requirements Engineering techniques
as part of secure system design.
A. Fieldwork is security sense-making
Focusing on security design activities at the same time as
Fieldwork activities heightened awareness of possible threats
and vulnerabilities at an early stage. For example, on one
site-visit, questioning the purpose of one particular PC led
to the discovery that not only was it superfluous to plant
operations, but the modem attached to it was vulnerable to
war-dialling attacks. On another visit, a chance conversation
about a car driving up to the plant’s main gate on a CCTV
screen led to the discovery that the plant had a second
gate, and the access control system for this plant entrance
was particularly weak. Based on these observations, we
believe that fieldwork makes two important contributions to
security design. First, de-familiarisation activities associated
with in-situ interviews leads to identification of hitherto
unseen affordances; these affordances are potentially ex-
ploitable by attackers. Second, opportunities for identifying
and analysing vulnerabilities happen at any time and, quite
often, such insights might have otherwise remained hidden.
B. Threats without up-front threat analysis
Useful information about attackers and threats was col-
lected without an up front threat elicitation exercise. This
is because threat analysis could be informed by the sense-
making activities associated with other analysis. There are
two reasons why this is an improvement over security
design methods relying solely on anecdotal information from
stakeholders or security experts to derive threats, e.g. [6],
[14]. First, threat elicitation is not exclusively contingent on
participatory approaches, which rely on getting stakeholders
together in a single location. Second, the task of eliciting
attackers followed by threats is easier than trying to elicit
attacks in their own right. While the empirical data can point
to possible attackers, further research is often necessary to
determine what threats these attackers can give rise to and,
as a result, which assets might be threatened.
C. Misuse Cases as cases
Misuse cases were useful for spotting more general falla-
cies made when arguing against the feasibility of a risk.
In particular, we noticed a tendency by stakeholders to
undermine the impact of the threat or the severity of the
vulnerability by focusing solely on the threat’s likelihood
and the asset directly under threat. During discussion of the
Site break-in misuse case, some participants highlighted the
limited number of staffed sites, coupled with the relatively
high frequency of PC theft, as a reason why incorporating
policy requirements to mitigate this risk might be infeasible.
However, when it was highlighted that the PCs themselves
were less important than the monitoring they facilitated,
and that the quantity of staffed and unstaffed sites had
little bearing on the impact of the risk, it was agreed
to transfer responsibility of the risk rather than ignore it.
When discussing the risk during the follow-up meeting with
ACME’s Information Security Manager, it was highlighted
that transferring the risk in its entirety was inappropriate.
Consequently, the policy goals related to securing physical
sites were reviewed to determine which were the respon-
sibility of ACME’s facilities management department, and
which needed to be pro-actively managed by ACME’s own
security team.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented the results of a case study
where Usability and Requirements Engineering techniques,
supplemented with techniques from Secure Software Engi-
neering, were used to elicit requirements for an information
security policy for a CNI organisation. This paper has made
three particular contributions towards improved harmonisa-
tion between Usability, Security, and Software Engineering.
First, we have motivated and presented the results of
an Action Research intervention in a real-life context of
contemporary interest; specifically, CNI in the immediate
post-Stuxnet world.
Second, we have successfully evaluated the efficacy of
integrating selected Usability, Security, and Requirements
Engineering techniques. Specifically, we have demonstrated
that rather than adopting a single process model, judiciously
selecting and applying appropriate design techniques for the
organisational context can be economical in terms of man-
power and time.
Finally, we have illustrated how we can achieve Security
through Usability. By focusing on the up-front development
of Usability, rather than Security, Engineering artifacts, we
can re-use the sense-making activities and empirical data to
elicit hitherto unseen vulnerabilities. From this, we can also
glean insights about possible system attackers and threats.
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